Automatic Verification of SMT Rewrites in Isabelle/HOL

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










Our Contribution: IsaRARE a tool to verify rewrite rules




- SMT Proofs
- Rewrites & RARE Language
- IsaRARE: Translation into Isabelle
- Evaluation on cvc5 Rewrite Database




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
- SMT solvers often used in safety and security critical applications
 - E.g., billions of calls a day at AWS
- SMT solvers are
 - \cdot large and complex software projects
 - $\cdot\,$ under active development
 - not practicable to be verified completely
- \cdot Despite best efforts they contain bugs
 - Disagreement between solvers on same benchmarks
 - Fuzzing tools often find bugs




Increasing Trust in SMT solvers




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Increasing Trust in SMT solvers



- $\cdot\,$ Record of reasoning steps the solver did to reach unsat
 - Proof steps are instances of the solver's internal proof rule calculus




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 - Proof steps are instances of the solver's internal proof rule calculus
- Proof can be checked independently:
 - Proof checking is usually easier than solving
 - \cdot Checker can be small enough to be formally verified

SMT solver						
Proof rules						
	*					
	Proof certificate					
	F					

- Record of reasoning steps the solver did to reach unsat
 - Proof steps are instances of the solver's internal proof rule calculus
- Proof can be checked independently:
 - Proof checking is usually easier than solving
 - \cdot Checker can be small enough to be formally verified
- Proofs can have different granularities
 - Tradeoff between checking and solving

SMT solver						
Proof rules						
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


Rewrites

• Modern SMT solver implement hundred of rewrites for better performance

 $(bvneg (bvneg x)) \rightsquigarrow x$

- Making this code proof producing is difficult and tedious
 - Requires a different proof rule for every rewrite
- Barbosa et al. (2022) and Nötzli et al. (2022) present a flexible infrastructure for proof production:
 - Low granularity: proof with holes for rewrites




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


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
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 - Low granularity: proof with holes for rewrites
 - High granularity: rewrites are filled in in post-processing step
- Advantages:
 - · Separate databases with rewrite rules can be used
 - \cdot Changes in rewrite code are easy



RARE:

- syntax is an extension of SMT-LIB 3
- \cdot proof reconstructor uses one or more rewrite rules to fill a hole



RARE:

- rules can be conditional
- supports matching n-ary functions using list arguments

```
(define-cond-rule str-eq-ctn-false
  ((x1 String :list) (x String)
   (x2 String :list) (v String)) ; list
 (= (str.contains y x) false) ; condition
 (= (str.++ x1 x x2) y)
 false
```

- : parameter

- : match
- : target

RARE:

- Unlike SMT-LIB, we support gradual typing
- Fixed-point rules give a hint to the reconstructor

```
(define-rule bv-sub-eliminate
  ((x ?BitVec) (y ?BitVec)) ; parameter list
  (bvsub x y) ; match
  (bvadd x (bvneg y)) ; target
```


A mistake in a RARE rule can have fatal consequences:

- \cdot The hole may not be fillable ightarrow incomplete proof
- \cdot An error in the code base might be covered up \rightarrow checkable proof but unsound result

Proof checkers will directly use rewrite database

- \Rightarrow If we want trust, every aspect of our toolchain must be trustworthy!
- ⇒ Solution: Verify each rewrite rule in a trusted environment

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We present the IsaRARE a plug-in for Isabelle/HOL which:

- provides the **parse_rare_file** command (taking in a RARE file)
- \cdot generates a lemma for each rewrite rule
- suggests a proof skeleton

The user only has to prove any lemma that is not proven automatically.

If a lemma is proven the corresponding RARE rule is sound!

IsaRARE re-uses the SMT-LIB parser in Isabelle/HOL whenever possible


```
(define-rule ite-then-true
 ((c Bool) (x Bool))
 (ite c true x)
 (or c x))
```

becomes:

```
lemma [ite_then_true]:

fixes c::"bool" and x::"bool"

shows "(if c then True else x) = (c \lor x)"
```



First, the rule is parsed into an AST using Isabelle's SMT-LIB parser. Then, IsaRARE:

- eliminates define-rule* rules
- adds implicit conditions (obeyed in cvc5 due to SMT-LIB syntax)

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Example of generated conditions with gradual types:

```
(define-rule bv-extract-extract
((x ?BitVec) (i Int)
(j Int) (k Int) (l Int)))
(extract l k (extract j i x)))
(extract (+ i l) (+ i k) x))
```

Every SMT-LIB term is mapped to an Isabelle term (E.g., and is mapped to $HOL.conj(\wedge)$)

- \cdot We extended the Isabelle bitvector term parser and add a new string term parser
- For gradual types we assign a dummy type
- \cdot Then, we re-infer types

```
if (x = y) then (bvand z u) else w
```

(a) Rare term

x::" 'a::len word"
y::" 'a::len word"
z::" 'b::len word"
u::" 'b::len word"
w::" 'b::len word"

(b) Most general types



- SMT-LIB uses n-ary operators (e.g, and, concat) but Isabelle does not
- During parsing the operators are binarised
- This does not work for lists! E.g., (and xs y)
- Many special cases, what if xs is empty?

(define-rule bool-and-false ((xs Bool :list) (ys Bool :list)) (and xs false ys) false)

 \rightsquigarrow (xs \land (false \land ys))



datatype 'a rare_ListVar = ListVar "'a list" datatype 'a rare_ListOp = ListOp "'a \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow 'a" "'a"

(a) Encapsulating Lists in a new Datatype

lemma rare_list_left_transfer
shows "rare_list_left op (ListVar xs) y = foldr op xs y"

(b) Transfer between new Definitions and Fold

lemma bool_and_true:



```
lemma [rewrite bool and flatten]:
  fixes xs::"bool cvc ListVar" and b::"bool" and ys::"bool cvc ListVar"
     and zs:: "bool cvc ListVar"
  shows "cvc list left (\wedge) xs
     (cvc list right (\wedge) (cvc list right (\wedge) b vs) zs) =
    cvc list left (\wedge) xs (b \wedge cvc list both (\wedge) True vs zs)"
  apply (cases zs)
  apply (cases vs)
  apply (cases xs)
  subgoal for zss yss xss
     apply (simp add: cvc list left transfer cvc list right transfer op (
                                                                             Proof state Auto
proof (prove)
goal (1 subgoal):
 1. 7s = ListVar 7ss \implies
    ys = ListVar yss \implies
    xs = ListVar xss \implies
    foldr (\wedge) xss (b \wedge foldr (\wedge) yss True \wedge foldr (\wedge) zss True) =
    foldr (\wedge) xss (b \wedge foldr (\wedge) yss (foldr (\wedge) zss True))
```

IsaRARE: Demo



Support all theories cvc5 has rewrites for:

- Added theory of SMT-LIB strings
- Added new term parsers to Isabelle (Strings, Sets, Arrays)
- Extended bit-vector term parser

Verify cvc5 Rare rules:

- Verify existing rules
- Iteratively use IsaRARE to develop new rewrite rules for bitvectors (85% reconstruction rate)

	rew	rites			
theory	old	new	untranslated	proven	automatic proof
Core	22	43	0	43	85%
Arithmetic	23	23	0	32	74%
Sets	0	7	0	7	100%
Arrays	0	4	0	4	100%
Strings	40	57	0	57	69%
Bit-vectors	0	168	3	122	66%

 Table 1:
 Translation and verification rates per theory

- $\cdot\,$ IsaRare discovered several bugs in the Rare rules used in cvc5
- Nitpick was particularly helpful in this respect
- For example:

```
(define-cond-rule str-substr-empty-range
((x String) (n Int) (m Int))
(>= n m)
(str.substr x n m)
"")
```

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```

Contributions Summary:

- Extended the RARE language and added 217 new RARE rules (mainly bit-vectors)
 - + 85% of by proof could be reconstructed from the go
- Developed IsaRARE, a plug-in for Isabelle
 - Efficiently re-uses existing SMT support in Isabelle
- Proved rules from all theories except BV correct
 - Many lemmas are proven automatically
 - The lemmas will be used in the reconstruction of cvc5 proofs in Isabelle

Parts of our work will be included in the official Isabelle distribution. The rest of IsaRARE will be submitted to the Archive of Formal Proofs.

Further work:

- Prove all bitvector rewrites in Isabelle (25% remaining)
- This work is part of a bigger project of reconstructing cvc5 proofs in Isabelle/HOL. The generated lemmas will be used for this!
 - We use the Alethe proof format (some reconstruction already exists)
 - $\cdot\,$ We added an Alethe back-end to cvc5
 - \cdot We prove Isabelle lemmas by showing every step in a corresponding Alethe proof holds
 - \cdot We also added functionality to use Isabelle as a proof checker for Alethe proof

Any questions?

Please feel free to contact me with any questions:



(a) Me, sometime this year



(b) A QR code

Figure 4: Means to contact me

Reconstruction of cvc5 proofs in Isabelle/HOL

